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This essay offers an account of Marx’s theory of history and his claim that law (and
morality) are “ideological,” and then asks what theory of law is adequate to explain the way the
Marxist theory understands law in both its ideological and non-ideological senses. I argue that
legal positivism, unlike other views about the nature of law, gives us a sensible explanation of
law for purposes of the Marxist theory of historical change, and that fact, in turn, gives us
another data point in favor of positivism as the only serious explanation of the concept of law.
I. Law in the Marxist Theory of Historical Change
Both “law” and “morality” are typically denominated part of the ideological
superstructure in the Marxian theory of historical transformation. According to what I will refer
to as the “Orthodox Functionalist” version of the theory (most clearly stated in the 1859 Preface
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and given systematic exposition by G.A.
Cohen in 19781), any socio-economic order has three important characteristics. First, there is the
level of development of the forces of production, the means by which human beings produce
everything that they need and (at later stages) want. The forces of production include human
labor power—a relative constant in history, except to the extent that humans grow somewhat
taller and stronger over time—and, more importantly, what we may call “technology,” namely,
all the tools by which human labor power expands its productive output, from the shovel to the
steam engine to the computer. The Marxist theory assumes, not implausibly, that the forces of
1

[add cites—note that Cohen’s version has to be supplemented with a causal version]
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production grow in productive power over time, and that assumption is crucial to the entire
theory.
Second, there are the relations of production, which we can, following Jon Elster,2 think
of as the “property rights” characteristic of a particular socio-economic order. In particular, the
crucial question is the distribution of property rights in the forces of production. For example, do
persons have property rights in their labor power (as under capitalism) or do others own their
labor power (as under feudalism)? Who owns the major forms of technology and mechanical
production? In the classic Marxist theory, the “proletariat” own only their labor power, while the
“bourgeosie” own all the other forces of production and purchase the labor power of the
proletariat for a survival wage. Under feudalism, feudal lords own all the forces of production,
including the labor power of serfs as well as their tools. In 21st-century capitalism, those who
own and sell their labor power often get more than survival wages—law professors are but one
example—and while the other forces of productions are largely owned by a small number of
private individuals, many others have partial stakes (through stock ownership) in small portions
of the forces of production.
Third, and finally, there is the ideological superstructure of society, which includes the
moral, political, legal, and religious ideas. The crucial claim of the Orthodox Functionalist
version of the Marxist theory of history is about the relationship between the three components.
According to this theory, what explains the content of the ideological superstructure is that it
contributes to legitimizing and thus stabilizing the relations of production (it does so by
presenting those relations as, inter alia, just, fair, natural, inevitable or some or all of the
preceding); and what explains the nature of the relations of productions is that they contribute to
maximizing the use and development of the forces of production. Historical transformations
2
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occur when, in the Marxian metaphor, the relations of production “fetter” the further growth of
the forces of production, that is, when the existing scheme of property rights hinders further
exploitation and development of new technologies. So, for example, at some point feudal
relations of production were incompatible with exploiting forms of production made possible
through steam and water power, as well as mechanical tools, thus giving the nascent bourgeoisie
an incentive to overthrow the feudal relations of production in order to allow them to effectively
exploit these new productive forces.3
Note that for jurisprudential purposes, the theory of historical materialism does not need
to be true (the theory is highly illuminating, more so than most theories of history, but like every
other general theory of all historical change, false); all that is required is that the theory makes
claims about the nature of law that are intelligible, not nonsensical, such that it is reasonable to
ask what theory of law is compatible with the claims of historical materialism. Marx’s theory
easily satisfies that standard.4 Given that, we need to be able to say what the law is in three
contexts for the Marxian theory:
(1) there are the laws that constitute the relations of production, i.e., the scheme of
property rights in the existing forces of production.
(2) there are the laws (and associated legal beliefs, e.g., “you are entitled to equal
protection of the law”) that are superstructural and ideological in the pejorative sense;
and
(3) there are the laws that are non-ideological and superstructural because they
characterize the legal relations of a non-class-based, i.e., a communist, society.
3
Hugh Collins offers a more subtle account on this point, but one that makes the same point, in Marxism
and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 21. On other issues, Collins is less satisfactory.
4
On what is true, and what is probably not true, see Brian Leiter, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion:
Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,” in B. Leiter (ed), The Future for Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2004), pp. __-__.
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The last category requires some further explanation. Contrary to Marx’s occasional utopian
speculations, there is no reason to think that communist socieities would not have both law and
morality. The case of law need only concern us right now (I will return to the case of morality).
As H.L.A. Hart argued a half-century ago,5 even a “society of angels” would have need of law:
not because angels would ever be inclined to do the wrong thing (angels never need to be
coerced), but because even angels need systematic guidance to coordinate their activities
effectively in the service of the common good. Angels need to know which side of the road to
drive on, which day to put out the recyclable garbage, and how to dispose of their property after
their death to those they want to inherit. Communist societies will be no different, and not
because Marx assumes that individuals in such societies will be “angels”; rather he assumes that,
in the absence of the need for constant competition for economic survival, individuals will
behave quite a bit differently than they do under capitalism. But such individuals will have the
same needs as those in Hart’s “society of angels” (including the need for post-mortem
distribution of their property, since communist societies only eliminate personal property in other
people’s labor and in the forces of production, including land, but not property in, inter alia, your
furniture, your heirlooms, and the like).
One suspects that the theory of law adequate to account for the concept of law in its first
role in Marx’s theory will be adequate to account for its third role: in these two cases, that
norms are norms of law does not seem to require any judgment about their merits, favorable or
unfavorable. But the second case is different: calling law “ideological” is, in the Marxian
theory, pejorative, though in a sense we will need to specify. Once again, it would seem a theory
of law that is neutral on the merits of legally valid norms will have an advantage in explaining
the pejorative sense of ideological law. Let us turn then to the notion of ideology.
5

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, __), pp. __-__.
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II. Ideology
What makes law or morality “ideological,” in Marx’s clearly pejorative sense of that
term? For reasons of both time and space, I am not going to venture into questions of textual
interpretation.6 Instead, I want to focus on what I take to be the philosophical interesting core of
the Marxist theory of ideology—I will call it, accordingly, the “Marxian” theory of ideology,
leaving for another day the question whether this is the best interpretation of everything Marx
said on the matter.7
On the Marxian theory, an “ideology” in the pejorative sense is an inferentially related set
of beliefs about the character of the social, political and economic world that has two
characteristics: (A) it falsely represents what are really the interests of a particular economic
class as being in the general interest (call this “the Interests Mistake”); and (b) the Interests
Mistake is only possible because those who accept the ideology are mistaken about (or ignorant
of) how they came to hold those beliefs (call this “the Genetic Mistake”).8 What makes a set of
beliefs with these characteristics “ideological” in a pejorative sense is not simply that it involves
mistakes—mistakes are extremely common in the cognitive economy of any person—but that
the mistakes affect the interests of the agent, that is, they are the kinds of mistakes that anyone
concerned about their actual interests would want to correct. And because of that, continued
credence in the ideology would not be compatible with understanding its actual genesis, since if
6

I have found instructive the following: Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Tommie Shelby, “Ideological, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,”
Philosophical Forum 34 (2003): 153-188; Michael Forster, “Ideology,” in M. Forster & K. Gjesdal (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth-Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and
Jaime Edwards, “The Concept of Ideology” (PhD dissertation in progress, University of Chicago).
7

Edwards and Forster, op. cit., are better on the interpretive questions.

Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory gets this almost right, except his “epistemic” sense of ideology is
overbroad: the Interests Mistake is not an epistemic mistake except in the trivial sense that it is false; but all
ideologies involve false beliefs, and so if an epistemic mistake is not confined to a mistake about justification, the
“epistemic” sense swallows all the others.
8
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those in the grips of the ideology understood the actual causal process by which they came to
hold these pernicious beliefs they would no longer accept them. (Why etiology of belief bears
on its acceptability is a point to which we will return.)
Here is an example that will help make concrete what is at stake in the Marxian theory of
ideology:
A. Members of the “Tea Party” in the United States believe that low taxes are in the
general interest (meaning, in particular, that they are in the interest of the lower- and
middle-class people who make up large portions of the Tea Party).
B. Members of the “Tea Party” are mistaken: low taxes are not in their interest, since
middle- and lower-class people depend on social security, medicare, public schools,
public parks, and other facilities that satisfy the needs and desires of most people and that
can only be funded at adequate levels if taxes are higher, especially on the wealthy. 9
C. Members of the “Tea Party” are mistaken about which policies are in their interest
because (in part) they are mistaken about how they came to believe (A), i.e., they do not
realize the extent to which propaganda by the ruling classes led them to their false belief.
If they realized the extent to which, e.g., billionaires fund advertising and candidates to
promote the belief in A because it serves the interest of billionaires,10 they would no
longer be able to believe A.

9
The complete account would require a more detailed theory of interests, though for purposes here it is
reasonable to assume that human needs and desires of the kind noted will play some role in an account of the
interests of persons in the United States.
10
[note, e.g., on the Koch Brothers front organization “Americans for Prosperity”] To be sure, billionaires
may genuinely believe that these polices are in the general interest, but this false belief is easy to explain given wellknown self-serving and wish-fulfillment biases to which humans are subject.

6

Nothing depends for our purposes on whether this is correct, though it is certainly prima facie
plausible. What matters is that it illustrates the conceptual structure of the claim that certain
moral, political, or legal ideas might be ideological
III. Law and Morality in the Non-Ideological Sense
The preceding account of ideology creates conceptual space for a non-ideological sense
of both morality and law in the Marxian theory. That is, moral or legal ideas can be nonideological insofar as (a) they do not falsely represent the interests of a particular economic class
as in the general interest; and/or (b) the acceptability of these ideas does not depend on obscuring
their genesis in class-specific interests. If legal or moral ideas do not represent the interests of a
particular class as being in the general interest, then it is easy to see why these ideas would not
be pejoratively ideological. But the second point is of equal importance, since Marx presents (as
we will see) communism as promoting class-specific interests—the interests of the vast
majority—yet does not think communist ideology is an ideology in the pejorative sense. Why
not?
Consider, to start, a quite different case. Suppose that we have the empirical science we
have because it is in the interests of the ruling class that we have this empirical science. This is
probably true: many (maybe all) members of the capitalist class have a powerful economic
interest in a correct understanding of the causal laws governing the natural world for obvious
reasons, so they have a reason to encourage an epistemically reliable empirical science that gives
them the understanding essential for effective productive exploitation of the natural world.11
This fact--assuming it is a fact--about the genesis of our empirical science would not affect its
acceptability, however. The acceptability of empirical science depends on epistemic criteria

Cf. Peter Railton, “Marx on the Objectivity of Science,” in R. Boyd et al. (eds.), The Philosophy of
Science [MIT Press, 1991).
11
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(such as evidential warrant, explanatory power and predictive success), and not on whether the
resulting claims are genuinely in everyone’s interest. So it can be true, both, that we have the
empirical science we have because it is in the interest of our capitalist overlords, and that fact
would not affect the epistemic acceptability of the claims of that science.
Moral and (many) legal claims are different from the claims of empirical science in this
regard. If we accept them as legitimate or warranted only because of a mistake about their classinterest-specific genesis, then discovering that fact makes them unacceptable, since moral and
legal claims are almost always presented as committed to a basic equality of interests. So, for
example, if the reason current U.S. free speech doctrine protects unrestricted spending by the
wealthy in elections is because this insures that the political system does the bidding of
plutocrats,12 then most people have no reason to affirm the free speech value of unlimited
political spending by the wealthy: if free speech is a value, it must be good for everyone, not just
the wealthy. (Notice that what is at stake is the moral status or acceptability of the legal claim:
the status of the claim qua legal does not depend on these considerations.) So, too, with moral
prescriptions and proscriptions: in both utilitarian and deonological versions, they present
themselves as objective demands, not hostage to the interests of particular persons. If the
acceptability of such norms depends on obscuring the fact that they serve the interests of only
certain persons, then such norms would cease to be acceptable.

12

How might that turn out to be the reason—the causal explanation—for why this is current legal doctrine
in the U.S.? The mechanism is complex. To start with, the U.S. Supreme Court functions as a super-legislature,
something both political parties have understood for a long time, and thus appointments to the super-legislature
inherit the plutocratic biases of the political system as a whole: so, e.g., far right U.S. Presidents like Reagan, Bush I
and Bush II nominate judges friendly to the prerogatives of the ruling classes, while moderate right U.S. Presidents
like Clinton nominate judges not hostile to those preregoatives. In addition, of course, there is ample empirical
evidence that the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court follows the political currents in the country as a
whole—for one compelling, qualitative study, see L.A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000)—and thus the extent to which the dominant public culture is
shaped by plutocratic interests will manifest itself in the ideas and values that predominate and that, in turn,
influence the Court.
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To sum up, in the Marxian theory, norms (moral or legal) are ideological insofar as (i) we
have the norms we have because it is in the interests of the dominant class that we have them; (ii)
we are unaware of the truth of (i); and (iii) being aware of the truth of (i) is incompatible with
continued belief in those norms being acceptable.
The preceding goes a long way towards explaining why Marx consistently presents the
communist normative point of view as a class-specific one. (I take Marx to be a kind of
consequentialist welfarist with regard to what we would call “moral” questions, i.e., he thinks the
right thing to do is what would maximize the well-being of the vast majority of humanity. He
does not argue for this, since he believes, correctly, that normative theorizing is irrelevant to
revolutionary practice: of course, the vast majority of humanity will be interested in maximizing
its well-being!13 The real aim of theory is to help the vast majority understand the actual
obstacles to realizing its well-being.) Marx describes,14 for example, “the proletarian
movement” as simply being “in the interests of the vast majority” (482). “The Communists
fight..for the momentary interests of the working class” (489). Marx derides the German “True”
Socialists (though he might just as well have been thinking of Habermas) for thinking that
socialism reflects “the requirements of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests
of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in
the misty realm of philosophical fantasy” (494). And he derides Critical-Utopian Socialists for
“consider[ing] themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the
condition of every member of society, even that of the most favored” (498). And similarly, from
The Communist Manifesto:

See my “Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory,” Stanford Law Review 54
(2002): 1129-___.
14
All cites from The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker (1978) , page references in the text.
13
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The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or
principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be
universal reformer. They merely express in general terms actual relations
springing from the existing class struggle, from a historical movement under our
very ideas. (484)
So the ethical imperatives of the Communist movement represent a class-interest-specific
morality, just one in the interests of the vast majority, as opposed to the ruling class. And
this morality is not ideological because its acceptability also does not depend on its not
being class-interest-specific--indeed, there is no mistake about its genesis either: “The
proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense
majority, in the interests of the immense majority” (482).
Notice that an upshot of this way of thinking about Marx’s own ethical views is that
it follows that the ethical imperatives of the communist movement would not necessarily
constitute the morality of a communist society. What such a morality would be is something
that will simply have to be discovered in the course of historical developments, since, as
Engels says, “all moral theories have been...the product...of the economic conditions of
society obtaining at the time” (726). Only under communist relations of production would
individuals actually discover the morality appropriate to a non-class society. The same is
going to be true of law, I take it. That is, whatever legal norms are necessary to guide the
affairs of a human community in which people are not continuously engaged in the struggle
for economic survival, we will discover them under those future conditions (assuming they
are attainable). But both legal and moral norms in such conditions will not be ideological in
the pejorative sense that Marx critiques.

10

IV. What theory of law is adequate to the Marxian account?
While Marx has, as I suggested above, recognizable ethical views (consequentialist
welfarism), he does not advocate for particular legal views. Law is not the instrumentality of
communist revolution, obviously. The general Marxian theory does, however, require us to be
able to say what the law is in three contexts, as noted earlier: (1) we have to be able to identify
laws that constitute the relations of production; (2) we have to able to identify laws (and
associated beliefs about the law) that are ideological in the pejorative sense; and (3) we have to
be able to identify law that is non-ideological because it characterizes the legal relations of a
non-class-based society. Only a positivist theory of law is adequate to these tasks; the bestknown non-positivist theory, Dworkin’s, is not. Indeed, Dworkin is, in Marxian terms, an
ideologist, someone who tries to systematize ideological illusions.
A positivist theory of law claims that what law is in any society is a matter of certain
complicated psycho-social facts; more precisely (1) law is whatever satisfies the criteria of the
“rule of recognition” characteristic of a legal system, and (2) the rule of recognition consists of
the criteria that officials actually apply in deciding what the law is and which officials treat as
obligatory (rightly or wrongly). For the Marxian, one virtue of the theory is that it is silent on
whether the valid law or the criteria of legal validity are justified, good, obligatory, or
authoritative. Thus, a positivist theory can describe (a) the laws that constitute the relations of
production, even the relations of production of societies that harm the well-being of the vast
majority; (b) law that is ideological in the pejorative sense; and (c) the law characteristic of a
non-class-based society. In all three cases, the legally valid norms will be whichever norms are
picked out by the rule of recognition (as constituted by the official practice); what distinguishes
the three cases will be, respectively, whether (a) the norms are constitutive of the relations of
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production, (b) the norms are ideological, in the sense defined in the prior section, and (c) the
norms are those of a communist society.
There are few serious alternatives to the positivist theory of law, despite a voluminous
and somewhat notoriously confused secondary literature.15 Natural law theorists like John Finnis
effectively concede the correctness of the positivist theory for the questions it was trying to
answer,16 while others, like Mark Murphy, admit that the only remotely plausible natural law
thesis—the “Weak Natural Law” thesis according to which necessarily law is practically
reasonable means somethinking like normal (or central) instances of law are practically
reasonable—is not obviously incompatible with positivism, as Murphy admits.17 The one
systematically articulated view in the literature that is genuinely anti-positivist is that of the late
Ronald Dworkin.
According to Dworkin, the law is whatever follows from the moral principles that
provide the best explanation and justification of law in roughly the positivist sense (i.e., “the
institutional history of the legal system” as Dworkin usually puts it). Dworkin’s view is not, as it
is often presented by casual readers,18 that “at least in hard cases, [judges] can’t merely ‘follow
I have come to the view after twenty years as a “professional philosopher” that there is no subfield of
Anglophone philosophy as intellectually corrupt and confused as general jurisprudence. There is, to be sure, a
serious body of work that arose from Hart’s transformation of the field a half-century ago, but then there has been an
extraordinary outpouring of fraudulent misrepresentation and rhetorical nonsense. This is partly due to the sub-field
being small, and partly due to the fact that its two main non-positivist figures were Dworkin (a gifted sophist, in the
pejorative sense of the latter term) and John Finnis (a far more responsible scholar than Dworkin, but one whose
Catholic dogmatism ruined even the best of his work). General jurisprudence is basically moribund as a serious
subject of inquiry. (I exempt from this charge certain recent interdisciplinary developments in general jurisprudence,
which are of general philosophical interest, such as work drawing on metaethics and philosophy of language.)
16
Finnis admits that positivism gives the correct account of “what any competent lawyer…would say are
(or are not) intra-systematically valid laws, imposing ‘legal requirements.’” John Finnis, “On the Incoherence of
Legal Positivism,” Notre Dame Law Review 75 (2000), p. 1611. Finnis complains instead that positivism does not
have an adequate answer to questions it was not asking, such as when there is a moral obligation to obey the law.
See the critical discussion in Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.
163-164, and also pp. 193-194. Finnis, alas, is a master of quietly changing the topic and the question to make it
appear as if he is having a dispute with the positivist.
17
Mark Murphy, “Natural Law Theory,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2005), p. __.
18
Cass Sunstein’s memorial notice for Dworkin, Bloomberg News
15
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the law,’ because there isn’t anything to ‘follow.’ What they have to do is produce a principle
that both fits and justifies the existing legal materials.”19 Dworkin’s view is that law, in every
case, is whatever would follow from the moral principles that provide the “best” explanation and
justification of the pre-existing positive law. Among other things, that means that no one may
actually know what the law is since no one may have identified the moral principle that provides
what is really the best explanation and justification of the earlier positive law.
For Dworkin, the idea of the best moral justification of the institutional history of the
legal system is a moral realist (or objectivist) one: given those principles that explain some
significant enough portion of the prior cases, statutes, administrative rulings, and so on, the one
that really provides the best moral justification of the legal system is the one that determines
what the law is on a particular question—not the one people around here happen to think
provides the best moral justification, but the one that really does, even if no one knows it. This
means that, on Dworkin’s view, no norms can be legally valid unless they are above some
threshold of objective moral justifiability. Often Dworkin and especially the handful of
Dworkinians still around tend to be coy on this point. But there is no reason to be coy, since
Dworkin himself was explicit that a satisfactory analysis of the concept of law must explain why
the exercise of coercive power in accordance with law is morally justified.20 Thus, Dworkin is
keen to urge us to acknowledge that for some societies, “in spite of the existence of familiar legal
institutions like legislatures and courts” if “these institutions are too wicked,” they may not
deserve the title of “law.”21 And he dismisses, without any actual argument, the ordinary view
that says if “the Nazis had law” it was simply “very bad law.”22 Dworkin dismisses this as a

19

Id.
Law’s Empire, 190.
21
Law’s Empire, 101.
22
Id. at 102
20
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“fact…about our linguistic practice”23 and so not a meaningful constraint on theorizing about the
nature of law. Everyone in polite society agrees, of course, that Nazis are not morally justified in
coercing people to murder Jews, even under the color of law; but no one other than Dworkin and
a handful of little Dworkinians think that when the Nazis enacted anti-semitic and genocidal
laws, they were not really laws. To be sure, we could stipulate that, but then we are doing
something different: not trying to figure out what the folk around here mean when they engage
in “law talk” but trying to prescribe when the honorfic “law” should attach to certain normative
standards. Armchair sociology is even less robust than actual sociology, yet even so, I really
have never met anyone who has not fallen through the Dworkinian looking-glass who actually
thinks it is an open question whether ordinary lawyers describe the Nazis as having laws, just
bad ones.
Notice, now, the problem this creates for a Dworkinian attempt to explain the concept of
law in Marx’s historical materialism: for “law”, on Dworkin’s anti-positivist view, can not fall
below some standard of moral defensibility. Start with the nature of the laws constitutive of the
relations of production in capitalist society. Whatever precisely Marx thinks about the moral
status of capitalism, he certainly does not think it is morally defensible, either from the
standpoint of the class-interest-specific morality of the proletariat or from the standpoint of the
morality that will ultimately characterize a communist society. The positivist theory of law has
no conceputal difficulty with this: the law constituting the relations of production (i.e., the
scheme of property rights) is whatever the officials of the system validate as legally binding from
an “internal point of view.” That the capitalist officials contribute to wickedness by validating
property right in the labor power of other human beings is not a problem for the positivist theory,
but it appears to be for Dworkin.
23

Id.

14

I suppose the Dworkinian might object that the laws creating capitalist relations of
productions are not, in fact, morally objectionable (or do not fall below the threshold of moral
acceptability necessary for them to be law) and that Marx is simply mistaken in his appraisal of
them. This would be a reasonable response, given the ideological character of Dworkin’s
philosophy (more on that in a moment). This would require the Dworkinian to defend the
objective correctness of bourgeois ethical judgments as against Marxist ones, and since the
history of moral philosophy is the history of specious arguments on behalf of differing moral
attitudes,24 one suspects such “defenses” could be mounted. But from the standpoint of
theoretical simplicity—still a virtue in theory-construction—it is far preferable to have a theory
of law (like the positivist one) that does not need to adjudicate the normative merits of Marxian
and Dworkinian views but can nonetheless individuate phenomena crucial to historical
explanations.
Dworkin’s theory has considerable more difficulty explaining Marx’s idea that law is part
of the ideological superstructure of society. “Law” is ideological, recall, insofar as it is guilty of
the Interests Mistake and the Genetic Mistake. More precisely, certain aspects of the law in
capitalist societies are ideological in the sense that their claim to normative authority (not
necessarily legal validity) depends on their being perceived as in the interests of all economic
classes and on the fact that they are not recognized, correctly, to really be only in the interest of
the dominant economic class. Since ideological legal norms fail precisely on the dimension of
respect for the equality of interests of persons, they could not possibly be morally justified on a
Dworkinian view which treats equality of interests as morally paramount.25 The Dworkinian
view—which collapses legal validity and normative authority--must deny that such norms are
See my “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics __
(2014): __-___.
25
[for D, it is ‘equal respect’…]
24
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really legally valid. But in so doing it renders incoherent the perfectly intelligble Marxian claim
that some of the laws characteristic of capitalist socieities are ideological in Marx’s pejorative
sense.
Ironically, perhaps, the Dworkinian view fares best with the status of “law” in communist
societies. In communist societies, neither “law” nor “morality” are ideological in character since
neither are class-interest-specific and neither depends for its acceptabilility on ignorance about
its genesis. In such a society, it would not be surprising if the legally valid norms (e.g., “drive on
the right, not on the left”) were also morally justifiable. Of course, the Dworkinian might think
that the standards of moral justifiability in a communist society are not, in fact, justifiable from
the standpoint of the bourgeois morality Dworkin endorses, and so even in this case the
Dworkinian might have trouble explaining legal validity. Certainly nothing in Dworkin’s
voluminous writings on issues of equality and politics suggests that he is anything other than a
liberal apologist for the capitalist system, and so a loyal Dworkinian probably should conclude
that the laws of a communist society are not morally justifiable, and so not really laws.
V. Conclusion
None of what I have argued here should really be surprising. One of the many virtues of
the positivist theory of law, as Hart noted more than a half-century ago,26 is that it allows us to pick
out an important social phenomenon—normative organization of society by law—that admits of
psychological, sociological, economic, and philosophical analysis and critique without prejudging
any questions about the value, justifiability, or moral propriety of such organization. Dworkin, by
contrast, was always, and obviously, an apologist for the capitalist system in his legal and political
philosophy: various incantations about equality and respect add up to nothing more than a call for
more redistributive taxation. Indeed, it is worse than that: we are offered, by Dworkin, the absurd
26

See Hart’s discussion of the “theoretical” virtues of his positivism in The Concept of Law, __-__.

16

image of the legal community of “integrity” as like an enormous family, in which associative
obligations to obey the law arise because of the “equal respect” enjoyed by everyone.27 Dworkin
articulated this vision in the midst of the reactionary “Reagan Revolution” in the United States,
when labor unions were busted, progressive taxation was reversed, laws regulating rapacious
capitalists were eviscerated, and America went decidedly “off the rails” as a civilized democracy.
In trying to present “law” in these circumstances as above some standard of moral justifiability,
Dworkin was the quintessential “ideologist” in the Marxian sense: he told a story about law that
obscured, from top to bottom, what was actually happening in the society at large.
The late G.A. Cohen, a brilliant scholar and philosopher, led Anglophone Marxism into
Christian moralizing in his late work, as I have argued elsewhere.28 But he correctly diagnosed the
moral hypocrisy of Dworkin (and his friends and colleagues like Thomas Nagel) in his book If
you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?29 The title was a jab at Dworkin, who owned real
estate fit for plutocrats in both London and New York while pontificating about equality. The jab
was apt for reasons that Nagel himself acknowledged:
I have to admit that, although I am an adherent of the liberal conception of [justice and
equality, like Dworkin], I don’t have an answer to Cohen’s charge of moral incoherence. It
is hard [as a bourgeois liberal] to render consistent the exemption of private choice from
the motives that support redistributive public policies. I could sign a standing banker’s
order giving away everything I earn above the national average, for example, and it
wouldn’t kill me. I could even try to increase my income at the same time, knowing the
excess would go to people who needed it more than I did. I’m not about to do anything of

Law’s Empire, Chapter Six.
Brian Leiter, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,” in The Future
for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).
29
[reference]
27
28
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the kind, but the equality-friendly justifications I can think of for not doing so all strike me
as rationalizations.30
This is admirably candid, but it also stands as an indictment of a whole generation of moral and
political philosophy in the Anglophone world. More importantly for our purposes, it confirms the
ideological character of so much normative philosophical work: its normative commitments do not
affect the practice of those who produce it, and yet its production allows them to advertise an
appealing-looking moral seriousness, but against the backdrop of economic relations which
systematically harm the well-being of the vast majority.

30

Nagel review of Cohen in LRB, p. 6.
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